On the night of 11 September 1905, six days after the peace treaty was signed in New Hampshire, the most famous ship in Japan blew up at her moorings in Sasebo harbour. A fire reached the after magazine of the battleship Mikasa, Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō’s flagship, and she settled on the bottom with her crew still aboard. Japanese accounts put the dead at 339. English-language accounts usually say 251.
Take either number. The whole Japanese fleet had lost 117 men killed at Tsushima that May, in the most one-sided fleet action of the age, so the Mikasa killed more of her own people in one night at anchor than the Russian navy had managed in two days of battle. The cause, as far as anyone could reconstruct it, was a craze among the sailors for lighting signal alcohol and blowing it out, done too close to the shells.
I start there because the Russo-Japanese War (日露戦争, Nichi-Ro sensō) is nearly always told as a triumph, and the triumph is the least interesting thing about it. It was fought between February 1904 and September 1905, almost entirely on Chinese and Korean ground, by two empires arguing over who would own Korea and Manchuria. It cost somewhere between 130,000 and 170,000 soldiers’ lives, nearly bankrupted the winner, set off a revolution in the loser, and ended with Korea losing its independence to a power that had gone to war promising to protect it.

In This Article
- A peninsula in between
- Korea first
- Port Arthur and the hill of 203 metres
- Liaoyang, Mukden, and whose fields they were
- Eighteen thousand miles to Tsushima
- Portsmouth, and a park on fire
- Korea’s road to 1910
- What Japan took, and what it mistook
- Where to see the Russo-Japanese War today
- Mikasa Park, Yokosuka
- Matsuyama: the museum and the Akiyama house
- Matsuyama: the Russian graves and the gold coin
- Nogi Shrine and the Nogi house, Akasaka
- Tōgō Shrine, Harajuku
- The ship at Sasebo
A peninsula in between
The road to this war starts ten years earlier, at the end of the First Sino-Japanese War. In April 1895 China ceded the Liaodong Peninsula, Port Arthur at its tip, to Japan by the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Within a week Russia, France and Germany “advised” Japan to hand it back, and Japan, with no fleet to argue with, did. The Triple Intervention was the most humiliating moment of the Meiji era, and the government turned the anger into a slogan from an old Chinese story, gashin shōtan (臥薪嘗胆): sleep on brushwood and lick bitter gall until you can take revenge.
Russia then took the prize for itself. In 1898 it leased Port Arthur and Dalian from China, began fortifying the harbour as the base for its Pacific squadron, and ran a branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway south from Harbin to meet it. When the Boxer uprising broke out in 1900, Russia moved something like 177,000 troops into Manchuria to protect the line, and after the uprising ended most of them stayed.

Korea was the real prize, and the Koreans were the people least consulted about it. In October 1895 Japanese agents and Korean collaborators broke into Gyeongbokgung Palace in Seoul and murdered Queen Min, the most capable opponent of Japanese influence at court. Her husband King Gojong fled to the Russian legation and governed from there for a year. In 1897 he declared himself emperor of a Korean Empire, an attempt to stand as an equal among empires that neither Tokyo nor St Petersburg took seriously.

Japan and Russia spent the next six years trying to split the difference. The Japanese formula was Man-Kan kōkan (満韓交換), the “Manchuria for Korea” exchange: Russia keeps Manchuria, Japan gets Korea. Russia countered with a neutral zone across Korea north of the 39th parallel, which would have put a Russian buffer within a day’s sail of Japan.
On 21 April 1903 four men met at Murin-an, the villa that Yamagata Aritomo had built in eastern Kyoto: Yamagata, Itō Hirobumi, the prime minister Katsura Tarō and the foreign minister Komura Jutarō. Katsura later wrote that the decision for war was made that afternoon. The surviving records suggest that Itō, the cautious one, mostly got his way, and the garden is still there if you want to sit where they argued (it turns up in my piece on Japanese gardens as a model of borrowed scenery).
Something had changed in between, which was Britain. In January 1902 the British, tired of a Boer War that had cost them far more than expected and worried about Russia in China, gave up the “splendid isolation” they had kept for a generation and signed the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. If any third power joined Russia in a war against Japan, Britain would fight too. It kept France out of the coming war, and it meant the Japanese would be buying British coal and borrowing British money.

Opinion inside Japan swung late. In June 1903 seven professors, most from Tokyo Imperial University, sent the government a memorandum demanding war, and the newspapers called them the Seven Doctors. The socialist Kōtoku Shūsui and the Christian writer Uchimura Kanzō argued for peace in the Yorozu Chōhō, then one of Tokyo’s best-selling papers. When Russia missed its own deadline to withdraw from Manchuria on 8 October 1903, the paper changed sides, both men resigned, and nearly every newspaper in the country was for war.
The Japanese reckoning was cold. The Trans-Siberian Railway was still unfinished around Lake Baikal, so Russia could move only a fraction of its army east. Once the line was complete, the arithmetic would turn against Japan for good. If there was going to be a war, it had to be early.
There was also the question of paying for it. The Bank of Japan’s vice-governor, Takahashi Korekiyo, went to London in the spring of 1904 to borrow money that almost nobody wanted to lend, because almost nobody expected Japan to win. He got £5 million in London by pledging the customs revenue and selling the bonds at 93.5 to the hundred, and at a dinner he met the New York banker Jacob Schiff, who loathed the Tsar’s government for the pogroms against Russian Jews and took the other £5 million through his firm, Kuhn, Loeb.

Korea first
Japan broke off relations with Russia on 6 February 1904. Korea had declared itself neutral that January, which made no difference at all: on 8 February a Japanese brigade landed at Chemulpo, the port of Seoul now called Incheon. The next morning Japanese cruisers caught the Russian cruiser Varyag and the gunboat Korietz in the harbour and wrecked them, and their crews scuttled both rather than surrender.

That same night Japanese destroyers made a surprise torpedo attack on the Russian squadron at Port Arthur. It damaged three ships, none of them fatally. Japan declared war on 10 February, two days later, and the Russians protested loudly about the timing. International law did not yet require a declaration before the first shot (the Hague rule that did was written in 1907, partly because of this), and Japanese diplomats pointed out that Russia had attacked Sweden in 1808 without one.

That protocol was signed on 23 February 1904, and in August a further agreement put Japanese advisers in charge of Korea’s finances and foreign affairs. The army hired or conscripted tens of thousands of Korean labourers to carry supplies north. A pro-Japanese society, the Ilchinhoe, sent volunteers by its own account of something like 50,000; Gojong was meanwhile sending secret appeals to the Russians, one of which was caught at sea.
The first big land battle came on the Yalu River, the border between Korea and Manchuria, on 30 April and 1 May. The Japanese First Army under Kuroki Tamemoto crossed and drove the Russians back, and in London the price of Japanese bonds stopped falling. It was the first time in modern memory that an Asian army had beaten a European one in open battle, and people in a good many colonies noticed.
The Second Army landed on the Liaodong Peninsula and on 26 May attacked the entrenched hill of Nanshan, on the neck of land that leads down to Port Arthur. It took the position and lost about 4,000 men doing it, and headquarters in Tokyo reportedly assumed a telegraph clerk had added a zero. One of the dead was a young lieutenant named Nogi Katsunori, whose father was about to sail from Hiroshima to take command of the siege.
Port Arthur and the hill of 203 metres
Nogi Maresuke was fifty-four, a Chōshū samurai who had lost his regimental colours to Saigō Takamori‘s army in February 1877, during the Satsuma Rebellion’s march on Kumamoto Castle. He wrote asking to be punished and, by most accounts, never forgave himself. In 1894 he had taken Port Arthur from the Chinese in a single day, which was probably the worst preparation he could have had for 1904.

The navy had insisted it could deal with the Russian squadron in Port Arthur by itself, by blocking the harbour mouth with sunken ships and mines. It tried three times and failed. When it became clear that Russia was sending its Baltic Fleet halfway round the world to join the Port Arthur ships, the navy changed its mind, and the Third Army was formed only on 29 May with Nogi in command and a short deadline.
What it faced was not the Chinese town of 1894. The Russians had ringed the port with concrete forts, machine guns, barbed wire, electric searchlights and covered roads between the strongpoints, and the maps the Third Army was given did not show half of them. Nogi’s first general assault, from 19 to 24 August, came straight at the north-eastern forts. By the Japanese count it cost 5,017 killed and 10,843 wounded, almost a division, against Russian losses of about 1,500 killed and 4,500 wounded.

The siege turned into the war Europe would fight ten years later: saps, mines dug under the Russian walls, hand grenades, and men killed by the thousand for a hundred metres of slope. A second assault in September and October took several outworks. It also made one hill matter more than any other.
That hill was the one the Japanese called 203-Metre Hill, after its height on the survey map, west of the town. From its summit an observer could see straight down into the harbour, where the surviving Russian battleships were sheltering, and direct the siege guns onto them by telephone. The navy wanted it badly, the headquarters in Tokyo agreed, and Nogi’s own staff kept arguing for the north-east.

The third general assault began on 26 November. That night about three thousand volunteers wearing white sashes across their chests, the shirodasuki-tai (白襷隊), so they could recognise each other in the dark, tried to storm the forts on the north-east front and were cut to pieces by mines and machine guns. The next day Nogi switched the attack to 203-Metre Hill.
For a week the summit changed hands again and again. On 30 November Nogi’s younger son Yasunori, carrying a message forward as a brigade adjutant, was shot dead on the slope. The divisional commander, an imperial prince, had moved him to a safer staff post after Katsunori’s death precisely so that Nogi would not lose both sons, and father and son had both asked him not to.
General Kodama Gentarō, chief of staff of the whole Manchurian army, arrived from the north on 1 December. In Shiba Ryōtarō’s famous novel he more or less takes the siege out of Nogi’s hands and wins it, and that is the version most Japanese readers grew up with. Japanese military historians who have gone back to the staff papers point out that Nogi had already switched to 203-Metre Hill before Kodama came, and the argument over how much Kodama did is still going.
On 5 December, after another heavy bombardment, Japanese troops took the summit for good. Japanese figures for the third assault are 5,052 killed and 11,884 wounded, and the Russians lost about 5,380 dead. Within days the observers on the hill had the Russian battleships in the harbour sunk or burning.

The fortress held out for another month. General Kondratenko, the Russian engineer who had built most of its defences, was killed by a 28-centimetre shell on 15 December, and Japanese sappers blew up the remaining forts one at a time from tunnels under their walls. On 1 January 1905 the commander, General Anatoly Stessel, offered to surrender without consulting his senior officers, several of whom wanted to fight on. The capitulation was signed on 2 January, and English-language accounts sometimes give the 5th, which was in fact the day of the meeting that followed.
That meeting took place in a farmhouse in the village of Shuishiying (水師営, Suishiei in Japanese) on 5 January. The emperor had sent word through Yamagata that Stessel was to be treated with honour, and Nogi let the Russian officers keep their swords, shared a drink with Stessel and allowed exactly one photograph, with everyone armed. Stessel offered his condolences for Nogi’s two sons.

The siege cost the Japanese army about 60,000 casualties out of some 130,000 men committed, by Japanese reckoning. The army’s official figure, the one English-language histories usually quote, is 57,780 killed, wounded and missing, of whom roughly 14,000 were killed, and on top of that more than 21,000 men went down with beriberi. Russian land casualties were over 31,000, and the Japanese took more than 24,000 prisoners when the fortress fell.
Nogi wrote a short poem in Chinese on the hill afterwards. He renamed it 爾霊山, Nireisan, which is a pun: read aloud it sounds like “two-zero-three mountain”, and written down it means “the mountain of your spirits”.
Was he incompetent? The British observers and the war correspondent Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett thought most of the lives lost in August, October and November had been thrown away, and Nogi himself wrote to the army minister that he had “no excuse” for his campaign of brute force. His defenders say he was given bad maps, too few guns and an impossible deadline by a navy that had wasted four months. I think both are right, and that the second explains the first without excusing it.
Liaoyang, Mukden, and whose fields they were
While Port Arthur bled, the main armies fought their way north up the railway. At Liaoyang, between 24 August and 4 September 1904, three Japanese armies under Field Marshal Ōyama Iwao attacked General Kuropatkin’s Russian army, and each side lost more than 20,000 men. Kuropatkin withdrew in good order. The Japanese held the town and had not destroyed anything.

In October Kuropatkin counter-attacked along the Shaho River and failed, and both armies dug in for the winter facing each other across frozen fields. In late January 1905 the Russians tried again at Heikoutai, on the far western end of the line, and nearly broke through the thin screen of cavalry there under Akiyama Yoshifuru, a Matsuyama man whose birthplace you can visit at the end of this piece.
Whose fields were they? Manchuria was part of the Qing empire, the homeland of its ruling dynasty, and China had declared itself neutral on 12 February 1904. Neither army asked permission. Villages were requisitioned, burned for firewood or shelled flat, crops were trampled, and Chinese men were hired, pressed or shot as spies by both sides.
Russian troops in particular looted and burned villages and assaulted Chinese women, and some of their officers treated every Asian as an ally of Japan. The Japanese appointed civil administrators who repaired roads and improved sanitation, partly for the army’s own sake, and many Chinese came to see them as the lesser evil. Mounted bandit bands, the Honghuzi, were paid by both armies to raid behind the other’s lines.
No one counted the Chinese dead. I have never seen even a serious estimate, which tells you something about who was keeping the books.
One small scene from this war changed Chinese literature. Lu Xun, then a medical student at Sendai, was shown a lantern slide in class of a Chinese man about to be executed by Japanese soldiers as a Russian spy, with a crowd of Chinese standing round to watch. He later wrote that this was when he decided that curing his countrymen’s bodies mattered less than changing their minds, and he left medicine for writing in 1906.
The last great land battle began on the eastern wing in late February. Japanese sources date the opening attack of Mukden (奉天会戦, Hōten kaisen) to 21 February, many English accounts to the 19th or 20th, and it lasted until 10 March. Ōyama told his commanders that it would be the Sekigahara of this war, the battle that decided everything.
Japanese histories put about 240,000 Japanese against some 360,000 Russians, around 600,000 men in all; English-language accounts usually say closer to 550,000. Either way it was the largest battle the world had yet seen. The Japanese tried to wrap both flanks round the city, with Nogi’s Third Army, which had come up from Port Arthur, swinging wide on the left.

On 9 March Kuropatkin ordered a retreat, and on the 10th Japanese troops entered Mukden, the old Manchu capital that is now Shenyang. Russian losses came to nearly 90,000, including twenty to twenty-five thousand men captured in the last two days. Japanese losses were 16,553 killed and 53,476 wounded, more than 70,000 in all, and once again the Russian army had got away.

Japan made 10 March Army Day, a national holiday until 1945. In private, the generals knew the army had reached its limit. Yamagata warned the government that Russia still had ample men and Japan had used up its trained officers, and through the spring Tokyo was quietly asking President Theodore Roosevelt to arrange a peace.
Eighteen thousand miles to Tsushima
Russia still had one card. In October 1904 the Second Pacific Squadron, usually called the Baltic Fleet, had sailed from Libau on the Baltic under Vice Admiral Zinovy Rozhestvensky to relieve Port Arthur. On the night of 21 October, in fog on the Dogger Bank, nervous Russian gunners mistook British trawlers from Hull for Japanese torpedo boats and opened fire, killing two fishermen. Britain came close to war with Russia over it, and the Royal Navy shadowed the fleet down the coast of Spain.

The voyage itself was an achievement. Neutral ports were not supposed to let a belligerent fleet take on coal, so the squadron coaled at sea from a train of chartered colliers, on the order of half a million tons in all, through the tropics and round the Cape. At Madagascar it heard that Port Arthur had fallen, which removed the reason it had come. It sailed on anyway to Vladivostok, the only Russian Pacific port left, taking the shortest route, through the Tsushima Strait between Korea and Japan.
Tōgō had been waiting for it since the winter at Jinhae Bay on the south coast of Korea, drilling his gunners. He was fifty-seven, a Satsuma man born in the same Kagoshima ward as Saigō, who had fought as a young gunner in the Boshin War as far north as the waters off Goryōkaku. He had then spent seven years in Britain learning his trade on the training ship Worcester and in British ports. In 1894, captaining the cruiser Naniwa, he had sunk a British-flagged transport carrying more than a thousand Chinese soldiers, most of whom drowned.
At 2:45 on the morning of 27 May 1905 the armed merchant cruiser Shinano Maru, patrolling west of Kyushu, saw the lights of a ship in the dark. They belonged to the Russian hospital ship Orel, which under the laws of war was required to show them. The Shinano Maru closed in, found the fleet behind her, and sent the wireless signal that every Japanese schoolchild learned later: “enemy fleet sighted”.

The fleet put to sea from Jinhae, and Tōgō’s flagship sent Tokyo a telegram whose second sentence was added by his staff officer Akiyama Saneyuki: “Today the weather is fine but the waves are high.” It sounds like a weather report and is usually read as a coded message: the sea was too rough for the small torpedo boats to attack in daylight, but good for the Japanese gunners, who were better trained than the Russians at hitting a target from a pitching deck.
At 1:55 that afternoon, with the Russian fleet in sight, Tōgō had the Z flag hoisted on the Mikasa. Its meaning had been fixed in advance: “The rise or fall of the Empire depends on this battle. Let every man do his utmost.” Anyone who had spent seven years in the Royal Navy knew where that came from, and the echo of Nelson at Trafalgar was not an accident.

A few minutes after two, Tōgō turned his whole battle line in sequence across the head of the Russian column, a manoeuvre that left each Japanese ship to make its turn at the same point while the Russians fired at it. The Mikasa took the heaviest fire. Within an hour the Russian flagship Knyaz Suvorov was burning, Rozhestvensky was wounded, and the battleship Oslyabya had capsized, often said to be the first modern battleship sunk by gunfire alone.
Whether Tōgō “crossed the T”, the textbook manoeuvre of putting your line across the head of the enemy’s, is one of the great small arguments of Japanese naval history. The historian Tōdaka Kazushige, director of the Yamato Museum in Kure, has argued that the plots of the battle show the fleets running roughly parallel, and that the T was a story released to the press. His critics point to the Mikasa‘s own action report, which records at 2:47 that the fleet “drew the shape of the letter T” ahead of the enemy. I read the report as settling it; Tōdaka’s case is the more fun to read.
Through the night Japanese destroyers and torpedo boats hunted the scattered Russian ships, and by the morning of 28 May what remained of the fleet, under Rear Admiral Nebogatov, was surrounded near the Liancourt Rocks, the islets Japan calls Takeshima and Korea calls Dokdo. Nebogatov raised the white flag at 10:34, but he did not stop his engines, as the laws of war required, so the Japanese kept firing for another twenty minutes.

The Russian fleet lost 21 ships sunk, six of them battleships, along with six captured and six more interned in neutral ports. Only three reached Vladivostok. Japanese naval figures put the Russian dead at 4,830 and the prisoners at 6,106, both admirals among them; Russian figures cited by the historian Inaba Chiharu give 4,866 dead, and English-language accounts round it to more than 5,000. Japan lost three torpedo boats, with 117 men killed and 583 wounded.
In July, with peace talks about to start, Japanese troops invaded Sakhalin, the long island north of Hokkaido, and took the whole of it in a month. Russia and Japan had already traded Sakhalin and the Kurils in 1875, and the Karafuto Ainu, who had lived there long before either empire, were once again moved about by a treaty they had no part in.
Portsmouth, and a park on fire
Roosevelt offered to mediate in June, and the two delegations met in August 1905 at the naval shipyard at Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Japan sent Komura Jutarō and its minister in Washington, Takahira Kogorō. Russia sent Sergei Witte, the former finance minister who had argued against the war all along, and its ambassador Roman Rosen.

The Japanese wanted an indemnity and the whole of Sakhalin. Witte refused to pay a single rouble or give up any land, and he could afford to, because he knew that Japan could not go on fighting and suspected that the Japanese knew it too. Japan had put about 1.09 million men into uniform. The war had cost, by the government’s final accounts, ¥1,826 million, at a time when the state’s entire annual revenue before the war was about ¥260 million.

The Treaty of Portsmouth was signed on 5 September 1905. Russia accepted that Japan’s interests in Korea came first, transferred its lease on Port Arthur and Dalian and the railway south of Changchun, ceded Sakhalin south of the 50th parallel and granted fishing rights off its Pacific coast. There was no indemnity. Roosevelt received the Nobel Peace Prize for the treaty the following year, the first American to win any Nobel Prize.
Almost no one in Japan knew how close to collapse the country had been, because the government had not told them and the newspapers had spent eighteen months reporting victories. The public expected the Russian Maritime Province and a fortune in reparations; the Ōsaka Asahi had already printed an editorial calling on the emperor to reject the treaty. When the terms came out, the reaction was fury.
On the afternoon of 5 September a coalition of hardline political groups called a mass meeting in Hibiya Park, Tokyo’s first Western-style public park, opened just two years earlier. The police banned it and barricaded the gates with logs. A crowd of perhaps 30,000 broke in anyway, then marched on the city.

Rioters also made for the Russian Orthodox cathedral at Ochanomizu, the Nikolai-dō, and were held off by guards. The government declared martial law in Tokyo on 6 September and brought in the Imperial Guard. By the end 17 people were dead, more than 500 were injured, over 2,000 had been arrested, and 87 were eventually convicted.
There were riots in Kobe and Yokohama as well, and the Katsura cabinet resigned that winter (English accounts give December 1905 or January 1906, depending on whether you count the announcement or the handover). Historians in Japan date an era of urban riots from Hibiya that ran through the Taishō era to the rice riots of 1918. I find it the most revealing event of the whole war: a people who had paid for everything, been told nothing, and wanted more war.
Korea’s road to 1910
The treaty was barely signed when Korea’s fate was settled, and not in Korea. On 29 July 1905 the American Secretary of War William Howard Taft and Katsura had already agreed, in a memorandum that stayed secret for nearly twenty years, that the United States would not object to Japanese control of Korea and Japan would not trouble the American Philippines. In August the renewed Anglo-Japanese Alliance recognised Japan’s right to “guidance, control and protection” in Korea.
In February 1905, in the middle of the war, Japan had also incorporated a pair of rocky islets in the sea between the two countries into Shimane Prefecture. Japan calls them Takeshima and Korea calls them Dokdo. Korea regards the incorporation as the first step towards annexation and Japan does not, and the argument is still running.
Gojong tried every door. In October 1905 he wrote to Roosevelt asking the United States to honour the 1882 treaty in which it had promised Korea its “good offices”, and gave the letter to an American missionary teacher, Homer Hulbert, to carry to Washington. By the time Hulbert arrived the protectorate had been signed, and the State Department declined to receive him.

On 17 November 1905 Itō Hirobumi came to the palace in Seoul with Japanese troops outside, and in the early hours of the next morning the Korean foreign minister’s seal was put to a treaty handing Japan control of Korea’s foreign affairs. Korea calls it the Eulsa Treaty, from the year in the old cycle, and often the Eulsa neugyak, the “forced treaty”; Gojong never signed it. Min Yeong-hwan, a senior official who had protested against it, killed himself at the end of the month, and Itō became the first Resident-General of Korea.
In 1907 Gojong sent three envoys to the Peace Conference at The Hague to protest that the treaty was invalid, and they were refused a hearing. Japan forced him to abdicate in favour of his son, took control of Korea’s government and disbanded its army. Resistance fighters, the “righteous armies”, fought on in the hills for years, and Japanese army records themselves count well over ten thousand of them killed.
On 26 October 1909 a Korean named Ahn Jung-geun shot Itō dead on the platform at Harbin, on the railway that had been at the heart of this whole war. Ahn was hanged in March 1910 in the prison Japan ran at Port Arthur. Korea was annexed that August. When the two countries restored relations in 1965 they agreed that the treaties of those years were “already null and void”, and they have disagreed ever since about which day “already” refers to.
Japanese armies had now been on Korean soil three times in a little over three centuries, after Hideyoshi’s Imjin War in the 1590s and the war of 1894. This time they did not leave until 1945.
What Japan took, and what it mistook
What Japan took was Korea, the leased territory at the tip of Liaodong, renamed Kwantung, and the South Manchuria Railway, run from 1906 by a company that became the largest business in the empire. The railway guards grew into the Kwantung Army, and it was Kwantung Army officers who blew up a stretch of that line outside Mukden in 1931 to start the conquest of Manchuria. Politicians liked to say that Manchuria had been bought with “a hundred thousand lives and two billion yen”, and by the Shōwa era no one could afford to say otherwise.
It also took a place among the great powers. In 1911 Japan finally recovered control of its own tariffs, the last piece of the unequal treaties forced on it after Perry ended sakoku, and the goal the Iwakura Mission had sailed round the world to pursue in 1871. Forty years after the Meiji Restoration, the country had what its founders had wanted.
What it mistook took longer to show. The army drew the lesson that spirit and the bayonet could carry a fortified position, if enough men were willing to die, and taught it for the next forty years. The navy drew the lesson that a single decisive fleet battle would settle any war and built itself around waiting for a second Tsushima. And the government learned that a public kept in the dark would forgive almost anything except a disappointing peace.
There was also beriberi. The army’s own medical history of the war counts 46,423 men killed in action, about 154,000 wounded, and more than 250,000 cases of beriberi, of whom around 27,500 died. The navy, which had changed its sailors’ diet in the 1880s, had 87 cases. The army kept white rice as the field ration, partly because barley spoiled and was hard to ship, and partly because white rice was the luxury that poor conscripts had been promised; the novelist Mori Ōgai, a senior army doctor at the time, is the man usually blamed, a verdict some Japanese historians think too neat.
Add the other diseases and the wounds that killed later, and the Japanese dead are generally put at well over 80,000. Estimates of Russian army dead run from about 34,000 to about 53,000, with another 9,000 to 19,000 dead of disease, plus some 5,000 at Tsushima. That makes the total somewhere between 130,000 and 170,000 soldiers, without a single Korean labourer or Chinese villager in the count.
Japan held more than 70,000 Russian prisoners in 29 camps around the country, and by most accounts treated them well, partly because it wanted the world to see it doing so. The first camp opened at Matsuyama in March 1904, and the town became so well known for it that Russian soldiers were said to shout “Matsuyama!” when they wanted to surrender. Many of the “Russians” were Poles, Finns, Jews or men from Central Asia, conscripted into a war that had nothing to do with them.

And across Asia, people cheered. Sun Yat-sen called it the first victory of Asians over Europeans in modern times, and the young Jawaharlal Nehru said it filled him with excitement. Nehru, writing in a British prison in the 1930s, added that the main result had been to add one more imperialist power to the list, and in Seoul nobody had needed to wait thirty years to see it.
The last word on the war in Japan, in a sense, belonged to Nogi. After Emperor Meiji died in July 1912, on the evening of the imperial funeral, 13 September, Nogi and his wife Shizuko killed themselves in their house in Akasaka, he by seppuku. It was junshi, following one’s lord in death, a practice banned by the shogunate two and a half centuries earlier.

Half the country took it as the last act of the samurai, and newspapers turned Nogi into the model of bushidō. The other half, younger and more modern, was embarrassed. Natsume Sōseki built the ending of his novel Kokoro round it, and Mori Ōgai, who had known Nogi, wrote a story about a seventeenth-century samurai’s suicide within days. I find Nogi’s death the most moving thing in this whole story, and also the most troubling, because the army that came after him took the moving part and threw away the doubt.
Where to see the Russo-Japanese War today
Port Arthur, now Lüshunkou in the city of Dalian, is in China, and 203-Metre Hill is a park there with a bullet-shaped memorial tower cast from spent cartridges and shell casings and inscribed with Nogi’s Nireisan. Most of what a traveller in Japan can see is closer to home: a battleship in Yokosuka, a museum and a cemetery in Matsuyama, and two shrines in central Tokyo. For a sense of how the war fits into the longer story, my walk through Japanese history and my list of Japan’s most decisive battles are the places to start.
Mikasa Park, Yokosuka
The Mikasa survived her explosion. She was raised in 1906, repaired, and served until the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 required her scrapping, at which point the other signatories agreed to let Japan keep her as a memorial, provided she could never sail again. Her hull was set in concrete and earth on the Yokosuka waterfront, and on 12 November 1926 the prince regent, the future Shōwa emperor, opened her to the public with Tōgō beside him.

She had a hard twentieth century. After 1945 the occupation authorities stripped her guns, masts and funnels, and the company the city leased her to opened a dance hall called the Cabaret Tōgō on her deck and an aquarium where the after turret had been. In 1955 a British businessman, John Rubin, wrote to the Japan Times about the state she was in, Admiral Chester Nimitz gave money from the royalties of his book on the Pacific war, and she was restored and reopened on 27 May 1961, the anniversary of Tsushima.
The ship was built by Vickers at Barrow-in-Furness and launched in November 1900, and Barrow still has a Mikasa Street. Steel from one of her guns damaged in the Yellow Sea battle of 1904 was forged in 1959 into a small set of swords, the Mikasa-tō, and if the subject of how a Japanese sword is made interests you, it is an odd footnote to it.

Inside, the displays tell the story of the war much as the preservation society would like it told, with a good deal about Japan’s victory inspiring Asia and very little about Korea. Go anyway. The teak deck is original, and you can stand on the open bridge where Tōgō stood and look along the forward guns, which are replicas, at the American warships across the harbour.
The ship is open from 9:00 to 17:30 from April to September, to 17:00 in March and October, and to 16:30 from November to February, with last entry thirty minutes before closing. She is closed from 28 to 31 December. Entry is ¥800 for adults, ¥700 for seniors and high-school students and ¥200 for children of elementary and junior-high age.

From Tokyo, take the Keikyū line to Yokosuka-Chūō Station, then walk about fifteen minutes towards the sea; from JR Yokosuka Station, the Mikasa loop bus stops at Mikasa Kōen, and a taxi takes about ten minutes. Ferries to Sarushima, the small wooded island just offshore, leave from beside the park, and on a clear day you can see the Bōsō Peninsula across the bay.
Matsuyama: the museum and the Akiyama house
Matsuyama in Ehime, on the island of Shikoku, has organised a whole tourist district round Shiba Ryōtarō’s novel Saka no Ue no Kumo (坂の上の雲, “Clouds Above the Hill”), serialised from 1968 to 1972. It follows three Matsuyama men through the Meiji years: the cavalry general Akiyama Yoshifuru, his younger brother Saneyuki, Tōgō’s staff officer at Tsushima, and their friend the poet Masaoka Shiki. It is the reason most Japanese know anything about this war, and Shiba, who had served as a tank officer in 1945, refused to let it be filmed in his lifetime because, he said, it would be misread as glorifying war.

The museum is open from 9:00 to 18:30, last entry 18:00, closed on most Mondays. Entry to the galleries is ¥500, ¥250 for over-65s and high-school students, and free for younger children. One warning: the galleries will be closed for air-conditioning works from 4 January to 29 March 2027, with only the free ground floor and library open, so check the museum’s calendar if you are going early in the year.
It is a two-minute walk from the Ōkaidō tram stop, which you can reach in about fifteen minutes from JR Matsuyama Station or from Dōgo Onsen. The museum does not try to tell you the war was a good thing, which in this subject counts for a lot. Shiba’s novel does, a little, and the museum quietly lets the reader argue with it.

Matsuyama: the Russian graves and the gold coin
North of the castle hill, in Miyuki, beside the archery hall of Matsuyama University, there is a hillside cemetery of Russian prisoners who died in the camp here and never went home. Matsuyama city’s guide counts 97 men; people who have walked the rows count 98 stones. The Cyrillic names look as if they were copied out by someone working from a dictionary, and not always correctly.


The camp itself has gone, but one object from it survived in the ground. In 1985 excavators digging out the great well of the Ninomaru, the castle’s lower enclosure, which had been used as the garrison hospital during the war, found a Russian ten-rouble gold coin. Years later someone noticed that two names had been scratched into it in katakana: a Russian prisoner’s and a Japanese nurse’s.

Nobody knows what the names meant to the two people who scratched them, and I like it that way. The garden has since been designated a “Lovers’ Sanctuary” on the strength of the coin and hosts something like 700 wedding photo shoots a year, which is not quite the same thing as knowing. It is open from 9:00 to 17:00 (to 17:30 in August and 16:30 in December and January), and entry is ¥200, ¥100 for children.
Nogi Shrine and the Nogi house, Akasaka
Nogi’s house in Akasaka, Tokyo, where he and Shizuko died, was left to the city in his will, and the street outside, once called Ghost Slope, was renamed Nogizaka. Nogi Shrine was founded beside it in 1923. The buildings were burned in the air raids of May 1945 and rebuilt in 1962, on the fiftieth anniversary of the couple’s deaths.

The shrine is directly above Nogizaka Station on the Chiyoda Line (exit 1 comes out about fifteen metres from the gate) and is open from 6:00 to 17:00. Entry is free, and a regular antique market fills the grounds on some Sundays.

Nogi and Shizuko are buried with their two sons in Aoyama Cemetery, a ten-minute walk away. The grave is plain and is easy to find from the cemetery’s signs.
Tōgō Shrine, Harajuku
Tōgō died on 30 May 1934 and was given a state funeral. Money for a shrine to him poured into the Navy Ministry, and Tōgō Shrine was dedicated on 27 May 1940, Navy Day, the anniversary of Tsushima, on land given by the Ikeda family just off Takeshita-dōri in Harajuku. Like Nogi’s, it burned in 1945 and was rebuilt, in 1964.

The shrine is three minutes from the Takeshita exit of JR Harajuku Station and five minutes from exit 5 of Meiji-jingūmae Station, and it opens at 6:00 (6:30 from November to March) and closes at 17:00. Entry is free. It is a quiet garden in one of the busiest teenage shopping streets in Tokyo, and you can walk on to Meiji Jingū next door, where the Meiji Memorial Picture Gallery in the outer garden has the large mural of Nogi and Stessel at Shuishiying.
The men who served with Tōgō did not, as far as I can tell, think of him as a god. He was short, silent and hard to read, and in his old age, as head of the crown prince’s education office and an elder of the navy, he lent his name to the officers who wanted to tear up the naval treaties that kept the peace in the Pacific. That is part of his story too, and the shrine, understandably, leaves it out.
The ship at Sasebo
The men who died in the Mikasa in September 1905 had come through the whole war: the night attack on Port Arthur, the blockade, the Yellow Sea, Tsushima. They were killed by the war’s end, not by the Russians, in a harbour at home, by alcohol and a lit match. Their ship was raised, repaired, preserved, turned into a dance hall and preserved again, and she is still there in Yokosuka with her bow pointed at the palace.
Go and stand on her deck. Look at the guns and the bridge and the brass plates about the rise and fall of empires. Then remember the number Japanese sources give for that night at Sasebo, 339, and the number for Tsushima, 117, and decide for yourself which of them belongs on the plaque.




