The throne of Japan is in Kyoto. It stands in the Shishinden, the great cypress-roofed hall of the old imperial palace, an eight-sided canopy on a lacquered platform, and for most of the year you can look at it across a courtyard of raked white gravel for nothing. When the present emperor was enthroned in 2019, the Takamikura (高御座) was taken apart, crated, driven to Tokyo, reassembled for the ceremony and then sent back. It went home because, in a strict sense, nobody has ever told it to move.
No law, edict or proclamation has ever transferred Japan’s capital from Kyoto to Tokyo. In 1868 a rescript renamed Edo; the emperor travelled east twice; the government quietly followed him; and the old capital was left to work out for itself what had happened. The new state never said it had moved the capital, only that it had “established” one in the east, and Japanese historians have been arguing about the right verb ever since.
I keep coming back to that throne because the whole Meiji Restoration (明治維新, Meiji Ishin) worked the same way. Between the autumn of 1867 and the summer of 1871 a few dozen men from the south-west ended a shogunate that had run Japan for 264 years, put a fifteen-year-old on the stage, abolished some 270 feudal domains and set in motion the end of the samurai as a class. At every step they called what they were doing a return: power returned to the emperor, land and people returned to the throne, government returned to the way of the founding emperor Jimmu. It was a revolution, carried out in the vocabulary of putting things back.

In This Article
- Why the shogunate fell: treaties, gold and a court that said no
- Satsuma, Chōshū and the court
- Giving it back: Nijō Castle, October 1867
- Nine gates and a dagger: the night of 9 December 1867
- The Kogosho conference
- Four days at Toba and Fushimi
- An oath to the gods, and a notice board the next morning
- Edo hands over its castle
- Edo becomes Tokyo
- Returning the registers, 1869
- Two o’clock in the afternoon, 29 August 1871
- From 302 prefectures to 43
- What happened to the samurai
- Where to stand in the Restoration today
- The Kyoto Imperial Palace
- Nijō Castle
- The alliance stone and the hill at Ryōzen
- Kagoshima: Kajiyachō and the Ishin Furusato-kan
- Hagi: the Chōshū side
- Tokyo: Tamachi, the castle and the picture gallery
- A capital nobody moved
Why the shogunate fell: treaties, gold and a court that said no
The story usually starts with Commodore Perry’s warships in Edo Bay in 1853, and I have told that part, and the two centuries of the closed country before it, in the article on the Black Ships. What made the arrival fatal was the paperwork that followed. In 1858 the shogunate signed a commercial treaty with the United States, and then with the Netherlands, Russia, Britain and France, opening ports, fixing low tariffs and putting foreigners under their own consuls’ law.
The man who signed was the great councillor Ii Naosuke, lord of Hikone, and he signed without the emperor’s sanction. Through the late Edo era scholars of the national learning and the Mito school had spread the idea that the shogun governed because the emperor had entrusted him with the task, a theory called taisei inin (大政委任), and Emperor Kōmei had refused to approve the treaty. That theory is the hinge of everything that follows. If the shogun’s power was a loan, it could be called in, and a shogun in trouble could, in principle, hand it back.

Ii crushed his critics in the Ansei purge and paid for it on a snowy morning in the third month of 1860, cut down outside the Sakurada Gate of Edo Castle by a band of Mito men and one samurai from Satsuma. A great councillor killed at the gates of the shogun’s own castle did more damage to the shogunate’s prestige than any foreign fleet. I have written about him separately in the article on Ii Naosuke.

The other damage was to money. Japan valued gold against silver at roughly one to five, while the rest of the world used about one to fifteen, so a foreign trader could change silver into Japanese gold coins, ship the gold to Shanghai and come back three times richer. Koban flowed out of the treaty ports by the chestful. In 1860 the shogunate fixed the ratio by shrinking its coins, and the new Man’en koban weighed 3.3 grams where its predecessors had weighed several times that.

Satsuma, Chōshū and the court
Two great domains in the far south-west made the most of it. Satsuma, ruled by the Shimazu from Kagoshima, and Chōshū, ruled by the Mōri, had both been on the losing side, or close to it, at Sekigahara in 1600, and both had spent the Edo period excluded from government. There is a story that Chōshū’s senior retainers asked their lord every New Year whether the time had come to attack the shogunate. It is almost certainly too good to be true.
They did not start as allies. In 1863 Satsuma and Aizu drove Chōshū and its radical court friends out of Kyoto, and the next summer Chōshū marched on the capital and was beaten at the palace gates in the Kinmon Incident, the fight in which the Shinsengumi made their name. Both then fought Western fleets, at Kagoshima and Shimonoseki, and lost, and both drew the same lesson, that whoever ruled Japan needed rifles, steamships and a single government.

On the twenty-first day of the first month of 1866, 7 March by the Western calendar, Saigō Takamori and Komatsu Tatewaki of Satsuma met Kido Takayoshi of Chōshū at Komatsu’s lodgings in Kyoto. Sakamoto Ryōma, a masterless samurai from Tosa, had brokered the meeting. Nothing was written down at the time. Kido afterwards set out the six points as he remembered them in a letter to Ryōma, and Ryōma wrote on the back, in red ink, that every word was as agreed.

What the six points promised is disputed. The conventional reading is a pact to overthrow the shogunate; the historian Aoyama Tadamasa, rereading Kido’s letter, argues that Satsuma promised only to lobby for Chōshū’s rehabilitation and to put troops in Kyoto if the shogunate attacked. Either way, when the shogunate did attack Chōshū that summer, Satsuma refused to send a man, and the shogunate’s army lost.
Then the shogun died. Tokugawa Iemochi was twenty; his successor, Tokugawa Yoshinobu, was the cleverest man to hold the office in a century and took it with visible reluctance. Within six months Emperor Kōmei was dead too, and the throne passed to his son Mutsuhito, fourteen years old by the Western count, the boy who would become Emperor Meiji. The two men who had held the old order together had both gone in the space of a winter.
Giving it back: Nijō Castle, October 1867
The way out was suggested by Tosa, the domain ruled from Kōchi Castle. Its retired lord, Yamauchi Yōdō, did not want a civil war that would hand Japan to Satsuma, and his adviser Gotō Shōjirō pressed a plan that had been circulating among reformers for years: let the shogun hand the government back to the emperor, keep the Tokugawa as the greatest of the lords, and run the country through a council of daimyo. Yōdō’s memorial reached Yoshinobu on the third day of the tenth month of 1867.
Yoshinobu took it. On the thirteenth he summoned the senior retainers of every domain of 100,000 koku or more who were in Kyoto to Nijō Castle and told them. On the fourteenth, 9 November by the Western calendar, he submitted the return of government, taisei hōkan (大政奉還), to the court, and on the fifteenth the court, somewhat alarmed, accepted.

It looked like surrender and was meant as the opposite. The court had no army, no treasury, no foreign ministry and no experience of governing anything larger than its own estates. Within a week it had asked Yoshinobu to keep running day-to-day affairs until a council of lords could meet, and confirmed that foreign relations stayed in Tokugawa hands. The shogun had given away a title and kept the government, and it was the most adroit move anyone made that year.
On the day the return was submitted, by a coincidence nobody believes was one, Iwakura Tomomi passed a secret imperial edict to Satsuma and Chōshū ordering them to destroy the shogun as a rebel. It carries no date in the emperor’s hand and none of the formal marks of approval, and most historians treat it as a forgery.

Yoshinobu’s calculation was that, in any council of lords, the head of a house holding four million koku would end up in the chair. Many lords simply did not come to Kyoto when summoned, and by the end of the eleventh month only Satsuma, Aki, Owari and Echizen had arrived in force. Sakamoto Ryōma, who had done as much as anyone to bring the two sides to this point, was murdered at an inn in Kyoto on the fifteenth day of that month.
Nine gates and a dagger: the night of 9 December 1867
Satsuma and its court allies needed to strike before the old order rebuilt itself around Yoshinobu, and the date was set by a treaty port. The opening of Hyōgo, today’s Kobe, was due on 1 January 1868, and if it went ahead smoothly under Tokugawa management, the shogun’s credit with the foreign powers would be beyond repair. Ōkubo Toshimichi planned the coup for the next day. Gotō of Tosa asked for two days’ delay and got one.
On the evening of the eighth day of the twelfth month the court held what turned out to be its last meeting under the old system. It pardoned the lord of Chōshū, lifted the house arrest of Iwakura and his fellow radicals, and recalled the radical nobles exiled since 1863. The courtiers went home in the small hours. Then troops of five domains, Satsuma, Tosa, Aki, Owari and Echizen, closed the nine gates of the palace and stopped the regent and the pro-Tokugawa princes from coming back in.

In the Ogakumonsho, the study hall of the palace, with the boy emperor present, Iwakura read the decree known ever since as the Restoration of Imperial Rule, ōsei fukko no daigōrei (王政復古の大号令). It accepted the shogun’s resignation and abolished the shogunate. It also abolished the regency and the office of imperial chancellor, which had been the court nobility’s own route to power for a thousand years, and replaced the lot with three new councils.
Then it declared that government would be founded anew “on the beginnings of the Emperor Jimmu”. I find this the most revealing phrase of the whole period. Jimmu is the mythical first emperor, placed by tradition in 660 BC, and nothing whatsoever is known about how he governed. Returning to his beginnings was a licence to start from a blank sheet.
The Kogosho conference
That evening, at about six, the new councils met for the first time in the Kogosho, a hall of the palace used for audiences, with the emperor behind the blinds. The question was what to do about Yoshinobu. Iwakura and Ōkubo wanted him stripped of his court rank and made to surrender his lands, jikan nōchi (辞官納地), before he could be admitted to anything.

Yamauchi Yōdō would not have it. The contemporary records agree that he attacked the meeting for excluding the man who had just handed back the government of his own accord, and that he said, in effect, that a handful of nobles were using a child emperor to seize power. In the famous version Iwakura rounded on him: everything today has been done by the emperor’s own will, how dare you call him a child? Yōdō apologised.

That exchange is in every textbook, and it may never have happened. It first appears in Iwakura-kō jikki, an official biography of Iwakura finished in 1906, and no contemporary source records it. What the records do show is that the debate went badly for Iwakura and Ōkubo. Matsudaira Shungaku of Echizen and Tokugawa Yoshikatsu of Owari backed Yōdō, only the young lord of Satsuma backed Ōkubo, and the meeting broke for a rest.
Saigō Takamori had been left outside with the troops. When a Satsuma man came out to ask what to do, he is said to have answered that it needed only one short dagger. The remark was passed, through the lord of Aki’s people, to Gotō, who understood it as intended and talked Yōdō round, and the meeting voted for jikan nōchi. Nobody used the dagger, which was rather the point.
The victory did not last a fortnight. Shungaku talked the land demand down from four million koku to half, and by the twenty-fourth day of the month the Tokugawa were merely to “contribute to the government’s expenses” at a level a council of lords would fix. Yoshinobu, who had withdrawn to Osaka Castle, received the ministers of six foreign powers there and told them that foreign affairs were still his business. By Christmas the coup had very nearly failed.
Four days at Toba and Fushimi
It was rescued by provocation. Since the autumn Saigō had been paying a band of rōnin in Edo, led by Sagara Sōzō, to rob, burn and murder their way around the shogun’s capital and then retreat into the Satsuma mansion. On the twenty-fifth day of the twelfth month the Shōnai domain, responsible for policing Edo, lost patience and burned the mansion down. When the news reached Osaka Castle three days later, the hotheads around Yoshinobu demanded war, and he let them have it.
On the third day of the first month of 1868, 27 January by the Western calendar, a shogunate army marched up the two roads from Osaka towards Kyoto, carrying a memorial denouncing Satsuma. At Toba and at Fushimi, south of the city, it ran into Satsuma and Chōshū troops who were waiting for it. The shogunate side outnumbered them by something like three to one on most counts. It lost anyway.

On the second day the court made Prince Ninnaji-no-miya Yoshiakira commander of the punitive army and gave him the brocade banner of the imperial forces, nishiki no mihata (錦の御旗). This was more theatre than tradition. The banners raised over the Satsuma headquarters at Tō-ji had been ordered in secret three months earlier, designed by Iwakura’s adviser Tamamatsu Misao, woven from Nishijin brocade bought through Ōkubo’s mistress and stitched up half in Kyoto and half in Chōshū.

It worked. A Tosa officer later recalled watching shogunate infantry go pale and fall back the moment they realised whose flag was facing them. On the fifth day the retreating army reached Yodo, whose lord was serving as one of the shogun’s own senior councillors, and the castle shut its gates on them. On the sixth the Tsu domain, guarding the far bank at Yamazaki, turned its guns on its former allies.
That night Yoshinobu left Osaka Castle by a side gate with Matsudaira Katamori of Aizu and a handful of others, rowed out into the bay, found that his flagship the Kaiyō Maru was away chasing Satsuma ships, and spent the night aboard an American warship. He sailed for Edo the next day. The army learned in the morning that its commander had gone.

In the chaos Osaka Castle caught fire, and when the flames reached the powder magazine the explosion took most of the palace and eleven of its twelve three-storey turrets. More of the Tokugawa castle was lost that week than in the bombing of 1945.
An oath to the gods, and a notice board the next morning
With the shogun gone, the new government had to say what it stood for. It needed the lords on side, and it needed the foreign powers to stop treating Yoshinobu as the ruler of Japan. The answer was the Charter Oath, Gokajō no Goseimon (五箇条の御誓文), five articles sworn by the emperor before the gods of heaven and earth.
The draft passed through three hands, and each left fingerprints. Yuri Kimimasa of Echizen wrote the first version. Fukuoka Takachika of Tosa turned it into a covenant between the emperor and the lords, moved “decide all matters by public discussion” to the top and put “an assembly of lords” in front of it. Kido Takayoshi of Chōshū then took the lords out, made it “assemblies widely convened”, and added a fourth article of his own: “evil customs of the past shall be broken off, and everything based on the just laws of heaven and earth”.

Kido also saw that a covenant between the emperor and his lords as equals contradicted the whole theory of imperial restoration. So on the fourteenth day of the third month, 6 April 1868, the emperor himself led his nobles and lords before an altar in the Shishinden, Sanjō Sanetomi read the articles aloud on his behalf, and those present signed a pledge to obey. Four hundred and eleven signed that day; by the end the total stood at 544, with 288 others.

Read closely, the oath promises less than it seems to. Fukuoka was asked many years later whether “assemblies widely convened” had meant that commoners would take part. He said, with some embarrassment, that it had not crossed his mind; “widely” meant councils everywhere, not councils open to everyone.
In 1872, in Washington with the Iwakura Mission, Kido heard someone mention the oath and admitted he could not remember what it said. Given a copy, he read it over and over that night and announced the next morning that it was admirably drafted, must never be altered, and that he would defend it with his life. I have a soft spot for Kido, and this is the main reason.
The day after the oath, the shogunate’s old public notice boards came down and the government put up five boards of its own, the gobō no keiji. They banned conspiracies, mass petitions and leaving the country, and repeated the ban on Christianity in the old words. Within months the government began deporting the hidden Christians of Urakami near Nagasaki, and the ban came down only in 1873, after the countries the oath was meant to impress had complained loudly; there is more in the articles on Christianity in Japan and the hidden Christians.
Edo hands over its castle
On the day the oath was sworn in Kyoto, Saigō Takamori was sitting in a Satsuma storehouse residence at Tamachi, on the bay south of Edo, with Katsu Kaishū, for the second day running. The imperial army had marched up the Tōkaidō and the general assault on Edo, a city of perhaps a million people, was set for the following day. Yoshinobu had shut himself up in a temple at Ueno and let it be known that he would not resist.
The groundwork had been laid by Yamaoka Tesshū, a swordsman of the shogun’s guard, who had ridden through the advancing army to Saigō’s headquarters at Sunpu with a letter from Katsu. Saigō gave him seven conditions. Yamaoka accepted six and refused the first, that Yoshinobu be handed over to the Bizen domain, asking Saigō whether he would surrender his own lord if their places were reversed. Saigō gave way.

At the second session Katsu offered terms that were scarcely terms at all: Yoshinobu to retire to Mito, the castle and ships to be handed over in due course, the shogunate’s men to be treated leniently. Saigō called off the attack on his own authority and took the answer to Kyoto. Part of the reason was British: Sir Harry Parkes had let it be known that he regarded an assault on a city whose ruler had submitted as indefensible, pointing out that even Napoleon had been exiled, not executed.
Edo Castle was handed over without a fight on the eleventh day of the fourth month, 3 May 1868. Fukuchi Gen’ichirō, a shogunate official who later became a newspaper editor, dated the end of the shogunate to that day rather than to the coup in Kyoto, and I think he had a point. The Tokugawa house survived as a domain of 700,000 koku at Sunpu, today’s Shizuoka, under a small boy, Tokugawa Iesato.

Not everyone accepted it. The Shōgitai, some two thousand loyalists, held out at Ueno until the fifteenth day of the fifth month, when Saga’s Armstrong guns shelled them out in a day. The war then moved north to Aizu and ended at Hakodate in the summer of 1869, as I followed in the article on the Shinsengumi. English-language accounts give the number of men mobilised as anything from 69,000 to 120,000; the figure for the dead, about 8,200, is more consistent.
Edo becomes Tokyo
Where the new government should live was an open question in 1868. Kyoto was the obvious answer and Ōkubo hated it. Barely a fortnight after Toba-Fushimi he proposed moving the court to Osaka, arguing that only a clean break would clear out “the stench of stagnation that has clung to the court for centuries”. The nobles killed the idea in three days.
Ōkubo settled for an imperial visit to Osaka, framed as a military expedition. The emperor set out in the third month, on one of the first journeys of his life beyond the palace walls, inspected warships off Tenpōzan and stayed for more than forty days. While he was there Edo surrendered intact, and the conversation shifted east.

Two officials from Saga, Ōki Takatō and Etō Shinpei, proposed a compromise that has shaped Japan ever since. Let Edo be renamed and made an eastern capital, from which to win over a region that had been loyal to the Tokugawa for 260 years; keep Kyoto as the western capital; one day, join them by railway. On the seventeenth day of the seventh month, 3 September 1868, an imperial rescript announced that the emperor would govern from Edo and that Edo would henceforth be called Tokyo, “eastern capital”. It did not say the capital had moved.
The enthronement took place in Kyoto in the eighth month, and in the ninth the era name was changed to Meiji, “enlightened rule”, with the new rule of one era name per reign. On the twentieth day of the ninth month, 4 November 1868, the emperor left Kyoto with some 3,300 people, worshipped at the Atsuta Shrine in Nagoya and crossed the Rokugō River into Musashi on a bridge of boats.

He entered Edo Castle on the thirteenth day of the tenth month, 26 November, and the castle was renamed Tōkyō-jō the same day. Edo’s townspeople had no particular reason to like an emperor, so on the fourth day of the eleventh month the government sent 2,553 barrels of sake, with flasks to pour it, to the 1,592 wards of the city, and declared two days’ holiday. People pulled out their festival floats and danced in the streets.

The emperor went back to Kyoto that winter to mark his father’s memorial and to marry. In the third month of 1869 he came east again, and this time the Council of State came with him; the empress followed in the autumn. Kyoto was told that the emperor was only visiting and would return for the great rice-tasting ceremony that follows an enthronement. In 1871 it was announced that the ceremony would take place in Tokyo.

Fukuoka Takachika recalled thirty years later that nobody at the time had imagined they were moving the capital; they were taking the emperor to pacify the east. The historian Okabe Seiichi argued in 1917 that the east had been made a capital without the west ceasing to be one, so the right word was tento (奠都), “establishing a capital”, not sento (遷都), “moving” it. Sasaki Suguru, in a study of 2001, came down the other way: whatever the paperwork said, Kyoto never got its government back. I side with Sasaki, but I enjoy the throne’s continuing refusal to be convinced.
Returning the registers, 1869
Moving the emperor east left the larger problem untouched. Outside the old Tokugawa lands and the confiscated estates of the rebel domains, about a quarter of the country, the lords still ruled their own people, raised their own taxes, kept their own armies and printed their own money. The new government had the emperor, but most of Japan’s revenue did not reach it.
The word for these lordships is itself part of the story. “Han” (藩), the term every history book uses for an Edo-period domain, was not an official word under the Tokugawa; it was a literary Chinese term that scholars liked. It became a legal category only in 1868, existed officially for barely three years, and its main purpose turned out to be abolition.

The first move was arranged among the four domains that had won the war. On the fourteenth day of the first month of 1869, Ōkubo of Satsuma, Hirosawa Saneomi of Chōshū and Itagaki Taisuke of Tosa met at Maruyama in Kyoto and agreed a text. Six days later the lords of Satsuma, Chōshū, Tosa and Hizen jointly petitioned the throne to accept back their land and their people, the registers, hanseki hōkan (版籍奉還). All the land under heaven was the emperor’s, they wrote, so how could they hold it privately?
The petition was beautifully vague about what should happen next. The court, it said, should “give what should be given and take what should be taken”. By the third day of the fifth month 262 lords had sent in petitions of their own. Ōkuma Shigenobu, who was in the government at the time, wrote later that most of them assumed they would get their domains back, just as each new lord had been reconfirmed in his fief when a new shogun came to power.

They were not quite reconfirmed. When the petitions were accepted, on the seventeenth day of the sixth month, 25 July 1869, the lords became governors of their old domains, chihanji, appointed by the throne and no longer hereditary. Their household income was fixed at a tenth of the domain’s revenue, and the domain’s accounts now had to be reported to the government. The court nobles and former lords were merged into a single new peerage, the kazoku: 142 noble houses and 285 daimyo houses, 427 families in all.
The samurai were renamed shizoku, “warrior families”, and their ties to their lords redefined as service to the same emperor. On paper this abolished the loyalty of vassal to lord that the later cult of bushido would make so much of. Most samurai noticed very little difference. They were still paid by the same people, in the same castle towns, in the same rice.
Two o’clock in the afternoon, 29 August 1871
Two years later the domains were going broke. The Boshin War had left their debts at roughly three times their annual income on average; the shogunate’s relaxation of sankin-kōtai in 1862 had spared the lords the cost of keeping households in Edo, and the war had promptly spent the savings. Several domains, Kumamoto, Nagoya, Tottori and Morioka among them, actually asked to be abolished, and some small ones were dissolved at their own request.

The government had also, at last, acquired an army of its own. In the second month of 1871 Satsuma, Chōshū and Tosa were ordered to contribute troops to a new imperial guard, the goshinpei, about ten thousand men, and Saigō came up from Kagoshima with the Satsuma contingent. Whether the guard was raised with abolition in mind is still debated; nobody doubts that it made abolition possible.
The decision was taken quickly and in secret. On the fourth day of the seventh month two middle-ranking Chōshū officers, Nomura Yasushi and Torio Koyata, talked Yamagata Aritomo into abolishing the domains at once. Inoue Kaoru, the vice-minister of finance, signed up next; Inoue persuaded Kido, Yamagata persuaded Saigō, and on the ninth seven men, Saigō, his brother Jūdō, Ōkubo, Ōyama Iwao, Kido, Inoue and Yamagata, drafted the edict in Kido’s house.

At ten in the morning on the fourteenth day of the seventh month, 29 August 1871, the governors of Kagoshima, Yamaguchi and Saga were summoned to the palace in Tokyo, with Itagaki standing in for the governor of Kōchi, and the edict was read to them. The governors of Nagoya, Kumamoto, Tottori and Tokushima followed. At two in the afternoon the 56 domain governors who were in Tokyo were summoned together and told, in a few sentences, that their domains no longer existed.

There was no resistance worth the name. The lords lost their domains and gained a tenth of the old revenue as private income, a peerage, a house in Tokyo, which they were now required to live in, and freedom from every debt the domain owed and every stipend it paid. For many it was the best financial news in generations. Saigō is said to have remarked beforehand that he would put down any trouble with troops; the only person who made trouble was his own former lord.
When the news reached Kagoshima, Shimazu Hisamitsu had fireworks set off at his residence for the whole of a day. It was not a celebration. It is the only protest any great lord made against the end of a system his family had lived inside since the 12th century, and I find it rather touching that it took the form of noise.
From 302 prefectures to 43
The first map was simply the old one with new names. Every domain became a prefecture, giving three urban prefectures and 302 rural ones, many scattered in enclaves miles from their capitals. By the end of 1871 they had been merged into 3 and 72; by 1876 into 3 and 35, which proved too large, and some were split again until the count settled at 3 and 43 in 1888, plus a separate administration for Hokkaido.

How many domains were abolished is one of those figures that will not sit still. Japanese dictionaries commonly give 261, the number left in 1871 after small domains had merged or dissolved; the count at the return of the registers was 274; English-language books often say “about 280” or round it up to 300. All of them are defensible, depending on the date you count from.
The debts were settled with a ruthlessness that has not had the attention it deserves. Domain notes were exchanged at the day’s market rate. In 1873 the government took over the domains’ borrowings since 1868 at four per cent over twenty-five years, made those from the 1840s to 1867 interest-free over fifty years, and simply cancelled everything older. Satsuma’s famous agreement with its Osaka creditors to repay without interest over 250 years was cancelled after 35, and a good part of the merchant class of Osaka went down with the rest.
What happened to the samurai
The samurai and their families made up, by most estimates, around five per cent of the population, and after 1871 the government was paying their stipends. Together with the payments to the peerage and the rewards for service in the Boshin War, these came to 37 per cent of state spending in the first year after abolition. A government trying to build a navy, a railway and a school system could not afford a hereditary class of close to two million people, most of them with nothing to do.

The dismantling took five years. Samurai were permitted, though not yet ordered, to cut off their topknots and leave their swords at home in 1871. National conscription came in 1873, removing the one service samurai stipends had paid for; the same year revenge killings were outlawed, the old right of vendetta that the 47 rōnin had made famous, and seppuku ceased to be a punishment the courts could impose.
In 1874 samurai were offered a lump sum, half in cash and half in bonds, for giving up their stipends voluntarily; about a third accepted. In March 1876 the haitōrei banned the wearing of swords in public by anyone but soldiers and police. In August the remaining stipends were abolished outright and converted into bonds worth between five and fourteen years’ income, the chitsuroku shobun (秩禄処分), the disposal of stipends.

For the former lords, the bonds were a fortune, and their money went into the first banks and railways. For most samurai they were nearly worthless. The interest on a typical lower samurai’s bond came, by one calculation, to about a third of a Tokyo labourer’s minimum daily wage, and a report from Tottori in 1882 found that nine-tenths of the prefecture’s former samurai had already sold theirs. Family armour went the same way, to pawnbrokers, collectors and the photographers’ studios of Yokohama.
Some did very well. Samurai were the most literate class in Japan, and they filled the new ministries, the police, the officer corps and the schools. But of roughly 418,000 heads of samurai households counted in 1883, only a little over a third were in government service or paying enough land tax to vote in prefectural elections.
The grievances turned violent in the south-west. The Saga Rebellion came in 1874, and in the autumn of 1876 there were three in a week: the Shinpūren at Kumamoto, the Akizuki rising and the Hagi Rebellion in Chōshū’s old castle town. Then, in 1877, Saigō Takamori, who had commanded the guard that made the abolition of the domains possible, led the samurai of Satsuma against the government he had helped to create and besieged Kumamoto Castle for fifty days. His death at Shiroyama that September is where most Japanese histories end the Restoration.
Where to stand in the Restoration today
Kyoto has the palace and the castle where the decisions were made; Kagoshima and Hagi are where the men who made them grew up; Tokyo is the city they turned into a capital. If you can only do one, do Kyoto, and give the palace a morning.
The Kyoto Imperial Palace
The Kyoto Imperial Palace (京都御所, Kyōto Gosho) has been open without reservation since 2016, and entry is free. You go in by the Seishomon gate on the west side, five minutes on foot from Imadegawa Station on the Karasuma subway line, through a bag check. It is closed on Mondays (Tuesdays when Monday is a public holiday), from 28 December to 4 January and on days of court events, and opening hours run from 9:00 to mid or late afternoon depending on the season, so check the calendar on the Imperial Household Agency’s site. Free guided walks in English start at 10:00 and 14:00 and take about 50 minutes.

The route takes you past the Shishinden, where the oath was sworn, where the throne still stands and where the Taishō and Shōwa emperors were enthroned, and the Ogakumonsho, where the restoration decree was read. Between them is the Kogosho, which is not quite the one Yōdō shouted in. The ground is all gravel, so wear proper shoes.

Nijō Castle
Nijō Castle is a short walk from Nijōjō-mae Station on the Tōzai subway line, and I have covered its history, from Ieyasu to Yoshinobu, in the article on Nijō Castle. The gates open at 8:45, last entry is at 16:00 and the castle closes at 17:00, with longer hours in high summer. A ticket including the Ninomaru Palace costs ¥1,300 for adults.

After the abolition of the domains the castle became, of all things, the Kyoto prefectural office.
The alliance stone and the hill at Ryōzen
The site of Komatsu Tatewaki’s lodgings, where Saigō and Kido came to terms in 1866, is marked by a stone in a quiet street in Kamigyō ward, a short walk from Kuramaguchi Station. There is nothing else to see, which is in its way appropriate for an agreement nobody wrote down.

The other place to go is the hillside above Higashiyama. Kyoto Ryōzen Gokoku Shrine (京都霊山護國神社) holds the graves of Sakamoto Ryōma, his friend Nakaoka Shintarō, and Kido Takayoshi with his wife Ikumatsu, along with hundreds of men who died for the imperial cause; the shrine is free, the graves cost ¥300 for adults. Take city bus 206 to Higashiyama-Yasui and walk about seven minutes uphill. Every year on 15 November, the day of the month on which Ryōma was both born and killed by the old calendar, the shrine holds a festival at his grave.

Kagoshima: Kajiyachō and the Ishin Furusato-kan
A remarkable share of the Restoration grew up within a few hundred metres in Kagoshima. Saigō Takamori was born in Kajiyachō and Ōkubo Toshimichi grew up there, a district of lower samurai houses beside the Kōtsuki River, along with the later field marshal Ōyama Iwao and the admiral Tōgō Heihachirō. Their house sites are marked by stones along the riverside, free and always open, about ten minutes on foot from Kagoshima-Chūō Station.

On the same bank is the Ishin Furusato-kan (維新ふるさと館), Kagoshima city’s museum of the Restoration, about eight minutes’ walk from Kagoshima-Chūō. It is open 9:00 to 17:00, last entry 16:30, and admission for visitors from outside the city is ¥600 for adults. It leans heavily on video and dramatised shows, but it explains the Satsuma side of the story better than anywhere else I know.

For the documents, go to the Reimeikan (黎明館), the prefectural history museum, built inside the walls of Tsurumaru Castle, the Shimazu seat, at the foot of Shiroyama. It is open 9:00 to 18:00, last entry 17:30, closed on Mondays and on the 25th of each month unless it falls at a weekend, and the permanent galleries cost ¥430. The secret edict of 1867 is in its collection, though not always on display.

Hagi: the Chōshū side
Hagi, on the Sea of Japan coast, is a long way from anywhere, which is much of its charm. Most people come by bus from Shin-Yamaguchi Station on the Sanyō Shinkansen, a little over an hour, and the town is small enough to cover by bicycle. It was Chōshū’s castle town until 1863, and its samurai district survived largely because the money and the railway went elsewhere.

The Shōka Sonjuku stands in the grounds of Shōin Shrine, east of the town centre. You look into it from outside, and doing so is free; the museums in the shrine grounds charge separately. Shōin was executed in 1859 at twenty-nine, in the Ansei purge, and his pupils went on to run much of Meiji Japan.
In the castle town, Kido Takayoshi’s former residence, where he was born and spent his first twenty years, is open 9:00 to 17:00 and costs ¥100. Hagi Castle itself was dismantled in 1874, and only the stone walls and moat remain at the western end of the town. That was the fate of most Japanese castles after the domains went: the twelve keeps that survived are in my guide to Japan’s original castles, and Matsumoto’s was saved only because a local man bought it at auction in 1872.

Tokyo: Tamachi, the castle and the picture gallery
In Tokyo, start where the city was saved. The site of the Satsuma residence where Saigō and Katsu met is marked by a round stone and a bronze relief at Shiba 5-chōme, a few minutes from the Mita exit of JR Tamachi Station or from Mita Station on the Toei lines. It sits at the foot of office towers, free and always accessible.

From Tamachi it is a short ride to the castle that was handed over. The Imperial Palace East Gardens, the old inner citadel of Edo Castle, are free to enter and closed on Mondays and Fridays; I have described the walk in the article on Edo Castle. The stone base of the keep, empty since 1657, shows you how much castle the new government inherited.
Finish at the Meiji Memorial Picture Gallery (聖徳記念絵画館, Seitoku Kinen Kaigakan) in the Meiji Jingu outer gardens, five minutes from JR Shinanomachi Station. Eighty large paintings tell the life of Emperor Meiji in order, and most of the murals in this article hang there. It is open 10:00 to 16:30, last entry 16:00, closed on Wednesdays, and the entry contribution is ¥500.

A capital nobody moved
For what came next, the railways, the constitution and the wars, see the article on the Meiji era, and for the whole run from Heian to Heisei, Japan Through the Ages. The four years from 1867 to 1871 have their own character. A small group of men took apart a working state using almost nothing but the authority of a boy and a vocabulary of return.
They gave power back to the emperor, and kept it. They gave land and people back to the throne, and administered both. They gave the samurai back to the emperor’s service, and then pensioned them off. Each step was presented as a restoration of something older and better, and each went further than the last, until there was nothing left of the old order to restore.
If you go to the Kyoto palace, give yourself a few minutes in the Shishinden courtyard with the throne in view. It sits where the oath was sworn, in a city that was never told it had stopped being the capital, waiting to be driven to Tokyo for the next enthronement and brought back afterwards. Of all the things the Restoration said it was returning, it is the only one that actually came home.




